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NO. 45706
BONNEVILLE COUNTY NO. CR 2016-1869

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Lorena Ocampo-Garcia contends the district court abused its discretion when it denied
her I.C.R. 35 motion for leniency (hereinafter, Rule 35 motion).

She asserts it did not

sufficiently consider the mitigating factors in her case which demonstrate a period of probation
would better serve the goals of sentences. As such, this Court should reverse the order denying
her Rule 35 motion.

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Pursuant to a binding plea agreement, Ms. Ocampo-Garcia pled guilty to injury to a child
with a great bodily harm enhancement. (R., p.207.) The binding agreement called for an
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underlying sentence of fifteen years, with three years fixed, but left open whether that sentence
should be executed or suspended or whether jurisdiction should be retained. (R., p.207.) She
admitted that, while supervising her boyfriend’s son, she battered him and he suffered a
significant head injury with ongoing conditions as a result.1 (Tr., p.20, L.5 - p.22, L.11.)
At twenty-five years old, this was Ms. Ocampo-Garcia’s first criminal charge and
conviction of any sort. (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.6.) Her LSI score
was only 15, which put her in the low risk for recidivism. (PSI, p.12.) She has two daughters of
her own, ages nine and one. (PSI, p.9.) As a result of her plea, Ms. Ocampo-Garcia was also
facing deportation proceedings, even though, after her father was granted residency, her parents
brought to the United States; she was only three years old at the time. 2 (PSI, pp.7, 13.) She had
earned her high school diploma, and was hoping to pursue training as a surgical technician if she
could resolve her residency status. (PSI, p.10.)
Nevertheless, both the PSI author and the prosecutor recommended the district court
execute Ms. Ocampo-Garcia’s sentence. (Tr., p.47, Ls.20-23; PSI, p.14.) Defense counsel, on
the other hand, recommended the district court retain jurisdiction because, in addition to
providing a period of incarceration, it would afford Ms. Ocampo-Garcia the opportunity to get
treatment, thereby promoting her rehabilitation. (Tr., p.57, Ls.15-23.) The PSI author, for
example, had recommended that Ms. Ocampo-Garcia participate in parenting and anger
management treatment programs. (PSI, pp.10, 14; see also PSI, pp.16-24 (the GAIN and mental
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Defense counsel noted there was some question about what, exactly, caused the internal injuries
(there had been allegations that Ms. Ocampo-Garcia struck the child with a toy and that he was
dropped or was struck such that he fell and hit his head on some pieces of wood), but he
indicated that did not need to be resolved under the language of the amended information. (See
Tr., p.21, Ls.8-22.) The prosecutor did not object to the substance of the proffered admission.
(See Tr., p.21, L.24 - p.22, L.4.)
2
Ms. Ocampo-Garcia has remained in the United States on a temporary work visa. (PSI, p.8.)
2

health evaluates concluding that Ms. Ocampo-Garcia does not have any substance abuse or
mental health issues which require treatment).) The district court acknowledged the mitigating
factors, particularly Ms. Ocampo-Garcia’s expressions of remorse, and endorsed the binding plea
agreement. (Tr., p.69, L.21 - p.70, L.1.) However, it followed the prosecutor’s recommendation
to execute that sentence. (See Tr., p.66, L.22 - p.67, L.1, p.67, Ls.24-25.)
Ms. Ocampo-Garcia subsequently filed a Rule 35 motion requesting leniency and the
matter was set for a hearing. (R., pp.225-27.) Though the prosecutor initially objected based on
the lack of new information with the motion (R., pp.229-30), at the hearing, defense counsel
represented that the prosecutor agreed that Ms. Ocampo-Garcia’s statements at the hearing
would constitute an offer of proof as to the evidence supporting her motion. (Tr., p.73, Ls.14-19)
The prosecutor did not contradict that representation. (See generally Tr., p.73.) In her statement,
Ms. Ocampo-Garcia added detail in regard to many of the mitigating factors discussed in the PSI
and defense counsel’s sentencing arguments (see generally Tr., pp.74-76), and provided new
information about other factors.
First, she noted that her elder daughter had begun exhibiting signs of depression as a
result of Ms. Ocampo-Garcia’s absence from her life. (Tr., p.74, Ls.2-8; see PSI, pp.7, 13
(indicating that Ms. Ocampo-Garcia had not been in custody prior to sentencing, as she had
moved in with her mother after her arrest).) Second, she explained that she did not have any
disciplinary issues in custody and had been hired as an inmate worker. (Tr., p.75, Ls.12-15.)
The district court noted that the color of her jail outfit corroborated that assertion, and accepted
that new information as accurate. (Tr., p.75, Ls.16-20.) Accordingly, Ms. Ocampo-Garcia asked
the district court to consider suspending her sentence with a term of probation requiring a year of
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local jail time. 3 (Tr., p.82, Ls.13-18.) She asserted such a sentence modification could have an
impact on whether she would be deported.4 (Tr., p.75, Ls.22-24, p.76, Ls.15-17, p.82, L.25 p.83, L.3.)
The district court commended Ms. Ocampo-Garcia on the fact that her understanding of
the crime and her outlook were continuing to improve, but it still concluded that the sentence
initially imposed was appropriate given the need for punishment in this case.

(Tr., p.83,

Ls.11-22, p.84, Ls.23-25, p.86, Ls.4-11.) As such, it denied her Rule 35 motion. (Tr., p.86,
Ls.19-22; R., p.232.) Ms. Ocampo-Garcia filed a notice of appeal timely from that order.
(R., pp.234-36.)

ISSUE
Whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied Ms. Ocampo-Garcia’s Rule 35
motion.

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Ms. Ocampo-Garcia’s Rule 35 Motion
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence pursuant to Rule 35 is addressed to
the sound discretion of the sentencing court, and is essentially a plea for leniency which may be
granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201,
203 (2007). When petitioning for a sentence reduction pursuant to Rule 35, the defendant must
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There was initially some confusion as to whether Ms. Ocampo-Garcia was requesting the
district court reduce the fixed time of the underlying sentence, which the prosecutor pointed out
would be a breach of the binding plea agreement. (See Tr., p.79, Ls.7-14.) However, after
defense counsel clarified what Ms. Ocampo-Garcia was requesting, the district court
acknowledged that the clarified request would not breach the binding plea agreement. (Tr., p.86,
Ls.7-11.)
4
The prosecutor did not contradict Ms. Ocampo-Garcia’s assertions about the impact such a
sentence modification could have in the immigration proceedings. (See generally Tr.)
4

show his sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information presented to the
sentencing court. Huffman, 144 Idaho at 203. “The criteria for examining rulings denying the
requested leniency are the same as those applied in determining whether the original sentence
was reasonable.” State v. Trent, 125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994).
The governing criteria, or sentencing objectives, are:

(1) protection of society;

(2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and
(4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. The protection of society is the primary
objective the court should consider. State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 500 (1993). The Idaho
Supreme Court has also indicated that rehabilitation is the first means the district court should
consider to achieve that primary objective. See State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, 240 (1971) (“We
recognize that rehabilitation, particularly of first offenders, should usually be the initial
consideration in the imposition of the criminal sanction.”), superseded on other grounds as
stated in State v. Theil, 158 Idaho 103 (2015). This is particularly true when sentencing a firsttime offender like Ms. Ocampo-Garcia. Id.; see also State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595
(1982).
The district court’s decision to deny Ms. Ocampo-Garcia’s Rule 35 motion is inconsistent
with the direction provided in McCoy, as it focused primarily on punishment to the exclusion of
rehabilitation in its decision. (See Tr., p.83, L.11 - p.86, L.22.) As defense counsel pointed out,
the suspended sentence with the year-long term of local jail time would better address both those
goals. (Tr., p.82, L.23 - p.83, L.3.) Consideration of a sentence which will promote, rather than
exclude, rehabilitative opportunities is particularly important when dealing with a young, firsttime offender like Ms. Ocampo-Garcia. See, e.g., Shideler, 103 Idaho at 595; Cook v. State, 145
Idaho 482, 489-90 (Ct. App. 2008). Such people are most likely to benefit from rehabilitative
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opportunities, and so opting to provide such opportunities now fosters more protection for
society in the long term. See, e.g., State v. Dunnagan, 101 Idaho 125, 126 (1980).
In fact, the proffered evidence indicates that, by not taking that opportunity, the district
court did more harm in that regard. That is because the decision to execute the sentence creates a
substantial possibility that Ms. Ocampo-Garcia will be deported, and so, removed from her two
daughters’ lives, whereas, according to Ms. Ocampo-Garcia’s statement in support of the Rule
35 motion, the sentence modification she was requesting might have been able to prevent that
scenario from unfolding.5 (See Tr., p.75, Ls.22-24, p.76, Ls.15-17, p.82, L.25 - p.83, L.3.) The
district court’s downplaying of immigration consequences as a mitigating factor (see Tr., p.86,
Ls.1-3) is illustrative of its failure to exercise reason in that aspect of its ruling on Ms. OcampoGarcia’s Rule 35 motion.
Additionally, Ms. Ocampo-Garcia’s new information in support of her Rule 35 motion
revealed that she had been able to peacefully adjust to life in prison. (Tr., p.75, Ls.12-20.) “The
[United States Supreme Court has] emphasized that ‘a defendant's disposition to make a wellbehaved and peaceful adjustment to life in prison is itself an aspect of his character that is by its
nature relevant to the sentencing determination.’” Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197, 201-02 (1986)
(quoting Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 7 (1986)). The district court’s failure to consider
the factors emphasized by the Idaho Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court further
demonstrates the abuse of its discretion. Since a sufficient consideration of all the mitigating
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But see, e.g., 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(48)(B) (“Any reference to the term of imprisonment or a
sentence with respect to the offense is deemed to include the period of incarceration or
confinement ordered by a court of law regardless of any suspension of the imposition or
execution of that imprisonment or sentence in whole or in part.”).
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factors reveals that the more lenient sentence was appropriate in this case, this Court should
reverse the order denying Ms. Ocampo-Garcia’s Rule 35 motion.

CONCLUSION
Ms. Ocampo-Garcia respectfully requests that this Court reverse the order denying her
Rule 35 motion and either modify her sentence as it deems appropriate, or, alternatively, remand
this case for a new decision on her Rule 35 motion.
DATED this 30th day of July, 2018.

/s/ Brian R. Dickson
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 30th day of July, 2018, I served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF, electronically as follows:
KENNETH K JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
Delivered via e-mail to: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
BRD/eas
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